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MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA: TORT LIABILITY THEORIES
AND DEFENSES
INTRODUCTION
On a recent episode of the television series Chicago Hope the fic-
tional doctor Aaron Shutt prescribes a costly drug for a manic-depres-
sive patient named Artie because the patient reacts violently to two
drugs covered by a health maintenance organization ("HMO").1
However, the HMO representative refuses to cover the new and ex-
pensive drug prescribed by Dr. Shutt. Without the medication, Artie
attempts suicide, and Dr. Shutt later pulls the HMO representative
into the patient's hospital room. "It's your fault!" Artie shouts out.
"I'm not a name on your list. I'm a human being, for God's sake." 2
The HMO representative apologizes and leaves. Dr. Shutt reacts by
saying, "[t]his is wrong, and you know it," although the representative
has gone.' Though this scenario is fictional, Chicago Hope, like other
medical dramas on television,4 illustrates two points. First, managed
care has become an integral part of American medicine. Second, in
spite of managed care's effort to hold down costs, the public believes
that the quality of medical care has been sacrificed.
Managed care is rapidly altering the practice of American
medicine.5 Today, more than seventy-five percent of the physicians in
this country practice medicine in a managed care organization
("MCO") or take care of managed care patients.6 Furthermore, the
rate of patient enrollment in MCOs continues to escalate, with almost
sixty million Americans currently enrolled in HMOs and another
I would like to thank Professor Mark W. Morris and Danielle Tuohey Bennett for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Caryn James, On the Doctor Shows, Public Health Enemy No. 1, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1998, § 2, at 30.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (discussing other medical dramas such as L.A. Doctors, Becker, and E.R., which have
addressed the public's frustration with HMOs).
5. See generally Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and Emerging Liabil-
ity Claims Arising From Utilization Management and Financial Incentive Arrangements Between
Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 155 (1997) (discussing the
emergence of managed care).
6. See GENIE JAMES, MAKING MANAGED CARE WORK 93 (1997) (discussing the number
of physicians in managed care organizations).
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ninety million in other types of managed care plans.7 In fact, News-
week estimates that over one hundred million Americans will receive
care from some sort of MCO by the year 2000.8
The term "managed care" generally describes a number of organi-
zations. These include HMOs and independent practice associations
("IPAs") that contain the costs and utilization of health care services
by using physicians as "gatekeepers" for hospitalization and specialists
for treatment and requiring prepayment by subscribers for services.9
The idea of such cost containment appears to have worked thus far.
In 1994, national health care costs increased just 6.4% per year com-
pared to an average increase in health care costs of 14.6% per year
from 1980 to 1985, and 12.6% from 1985 to 1990.10
While the reduction of costs highlights the advantages of managed
care, the negative aspects of MCO's quality of care have proliferated
in the media and the public. Kafkaesque and nightmare stories
abound in the popular press; many examples of substandard patient
care are found in books." The public increasingly believes that the
care provided through MCOs is inferior to traditional fee-for-service
care.' 2 Responding to such growing dissatisfaction with managed
care, President Bill Clinton proposed a national Patient's Bill of
Rights in his 1998 State of the Union address.' 3
The national MCO trends are mirrored in North Carolina. Today,
more than three million North Carolinians are enrolled in some sort
of MCO plan.'4 Furthermore, enrollment in full-service HMOs rose
7. Robert Pear, Laws Won't Let H.M.O.'s Tell Doctors What to Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1996, at A12.
8. See Ellyn Spragins, Does Your HMO Stack Up?, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1996, at 56, 56
(reporting that enrollment in HMOs has climbed from 6 million in 1976 to 53.3 million in 1995
and is projected to reach 103.2 million by 2000).
9. See PHYSICIANS IN MANAGED CARE: A CAREER GUIDE 22 (Mark A. Bloomberg &
Steven R. Mohlie eds., 1994) (describing the various types of managed care organizations).
10. Timothy N. Troy, Does Managed Care Work?, MANAGED HEALTHCARE, July 1996, at
21, 25.
11. See, e.g., GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN
OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996) (describing many horrific examples of substandard HMO care).
12. See Stuart Auerbach, Managed Care Backlash: As Marketplace Changes, Consumers are
Caught in the Middle, WASH. POST, June 25, 1996, at Z12 (discussing a study reporting that 53%
of respondents felt that the healthcare system was getting worse while only 38% believed that it
was improving).
13. In his State of the Union address, President Clinton said:
You have the right to know all your medical options, not just the cheapest. You have the
right to choose the doctors you want for the care you need. You have the right to emer-
gency room care, wherever and whenever you need it. You have the right to keep your
medical records confidential.
Julie Martin & Mark Blaine, Patients Forcing New Laws on HMOs, ASHEVILLE CrTIZEN-TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1998, at Al.
14. See Pam Silberman, Editorial, Health Care Changing: N.C. Patients Need Protections,
WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Jan., 16, 1998, at A13 (noting that more than one million resi-
1997-98]
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forty percent from 1991 to 1996.1' In spite of the enrollment growth
in MCOs, experts believe that North Carolina law provides insuffi-
cient protection for patients. A recent examination of state laws to
protect HMO enrollees gave North Carolina a grade of C-minus. 1 6
Not surprisingly, like the outcry at the national level, angry doctors
and patients in North Carolina are voicing their concerns.' 7 Doctors
have threatened to flee their HMOs, leaving patients in the lurch. 18
Patients have experienced low-quality care due to managed care
abuses.19 In response, the state's trial lawyers and doctors are seeking
legislation that would expand the liability of HMOs.2"
Nationally, during the 1998 mid-term elections, both Democrats
and Republicans scrambled to respond to enormous public resent-
dents are enrolled in full-service HMOs and more than two million in preferred provider organi-
zations ("PPOs")).
15. Martin & Blaine, supra note 13, at Al.
16. See Silberman, supra note 14, at A13 (discussing a study conducted by the Cecil G.
Sheps Center for Health Research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the
North Carolina Institute of Medicine); see also Editorial, Barely Passing: A UNC Study Says
North Carolina's HMOs Must Be Better Regulated in Order to Protect Consumers From Bottom-
Line Decision Making, THE CHAPEL HILL HERALD, May 2, 1997, at 4 (noting that North Caro-
lina is one of only two states that has no minimum benefits package for HMO plans).
17. Catherine Clabby, Patient Complaints Put Managed Care Under the Knife, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 13, 1998, at A27 (noting that a Mason-Dixon poll of North
Carolinians showed 56% of men and 76% of women as rating the performance of their HMOs as
only fair or poor).
18. See Catherine Clabby & Joel B. Obermayer, HMO Fee Cuts Anger Doctors, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 1, 1998, at Al (noting that HMOs Healthsource and Blue Cross
and Blue Shield cut doctors' fees).
19. Dr. Roger Shetterly, an ophthlamologist in Hendersonville, North Carolina, shared one
story about his patient. A woman who had spontaneously lost sight was referred to the Hender-
sonville ophthalmologist by another doctor. Shetterly examined the woman and found she was
legally blind. She had a detached retina, which required emergency surgery. Shetterly referred
her to a specialist in the type of surgery the woman needed. Had the woman gone to the sur-
geon, "he would have probably taken her into surgery that night and done the surgery then,"
said Shetterly. Rather, the woman couldn't keep the appointment because the doctor wasn't a
provider for her managed care company. The managed care company listened to her situation
over the telephone and sent her to another doctor, which brought more delays, even though the
woman finally received surgery a day later. The patient never recovered her sight in that eye.
Shetterly says, "they referred her to someone of their choice without consulting me. Here I'm
the responsible doctor losing control of the patient to a nonmedical person telling them that's
who they have to go to .... This patient is being guided to another specialist only because of a
financial relationship with the HMO, not because he is qualified to do that kind of work." Mar-
tin & Blaine, supra note 13, at Al.
20. See Catherine Clabby, Opening HMOs to Lawsuits, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Mar. 26, 1998, at Al (discussing proposed legislation in North Carolina to expand tort
liability of HMOs); see also Martin & Blaine supra note 13, at Al (discussing proposals to open
HMOs to lawsuits); see also Catherine Clabby, Calls Growing for HMO Reforms, NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 11, 1998, at Al (discussing a poll which noted that eighty percent
of North Carolinians believed that HMOs should be held legally liable for complications that
occur when medical treatments are denied).
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ment against managed care.21 Perhaps the best example of translat-
ing such public anger into a hot political issue was the 1998 United
States Senate race in North Carolina.22 "I think it just infuriates peo-
ple that medical decisions, things that affect their lives and their chil-
dren's lives, are being made by some bureaucrat sitting behind some
computer screen up in Hartford, Connecticut," Democratic nominee
John Edwards, a telegenic, forty-five year-old trial lawyer, intoned in
his television commercial.23 Then-candidate Edwards never stopped
talking about the issue ever since he noticed that people got angry
almost every time he mentioned managed care.24
In short, the fact remains that while MCOs can save patients money
in monthly premiums, they can cost patients in the long run. Yet,
MCOs encounter minimal litigation for medical accidents, namely be-
cause current tort principals focus on the physician while shielding the
MCO, and federal law supports these tort defenses with the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act preemption.25 In North Carolina, no
court has issued a definitive ruling on whether an MCO can be held
liable for the negligence of member-physicians. This Comment argues
that MCOs should be liable for negligent patient care and for their
member-physicians' malpractice. Part I of this Comment provides a
brief discussion of the three types of MCO models most popular to-
day. Part II examines the theories that are available under North Car-
olina law to impute vicarious liability to MCOs based on member-
physicians' malpractice. Part III looks at alternatives to vicarious lia-
bilities, such as how MCOs can be held directly liable for their own
tortious conduct. Finally, Part IV evaluates possible MCO defenses
21. See Amy Goldstein & Terry Neal, Health Care Uproar Has Hill Scrambling: Polls Favor
Action on "Patient's Rights", WASH. POST, May 31, 1998, at Al (discussing a public opinion poll
which suggests that nine out of ten Americans favor candidates willing to tighten the reins on
HMOs); see also Peter T. Kilborn, Voter's Anger at H.M.O. 's Plays as Hot Political Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1998, § 4, at 1 (discussing how candidates in primaries and general elections for
governor and Congress typically promoted access to more doctors, a right to appeal managed
care organizations' decisions, and freedom to sue the organization for malpractice).
22. See Lizette Alvarez, Health Issues Dominate Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, § 1,
at 10 (discussing Edwards' effective use of the HMO issue); see also Helen Dewar, North Caro-
lina's Stark Clash, WASH. PosT, July 11, 1998, at Al (noting that the managed care issue was
addressed initially by proposed Democratic legislation and later found its place in the Republi-
can campaign).
23. Alvarez, supra note 22, § 1, at 10.
24. Id. In response to the Edwards' ads, The Health Benefits Coalition, a national group of
corporations dominated by the insurance industry began running ads. One radio ads begins with
the sound of a man laughing. "America's trial lawyers are laughing all the way to the bank,"
says the announcer. "For years, they've gotten rich filing lawsuit, after lawsuit, after lawsuit."
Rob Christensen, Managed Care Fuels Early Ad War in Senate Race, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh, N.C.), June 4, 1998, at Al.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1994).
1997-981
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that have rendered much of the negligent managed care organizations
immune to lawsuits.
I. STANDARD HMO MODELS
Before assessing the consequences of imposing tort liability on
MCOs, it is important to first understand their basic structure. MCOs
are most commonly represented by HMOs, which can be categorized
into one of three basic models. 26 In the "staff" model, the HMO di-
rectly employs health care providers, such as physicians and nurses.2 7
These providers are salaried employees of the HMO and exclusively
devote their services to the HMO enrollees; they do not maintain a
private practice. 28 Finally, the HMO owns and operates the facilities
and equipment used in patient treatment.29
In the "group model," the HMO contracts with a medical group
practice that in turn delivers health care to the organization's enrolled
members.30 The physicians in the group, acting as independent con-
tractors for the HMO, care for HMO members at the group's health
care facility in exchange for a set monthly fee for each enrollee.3' The
HMO usually pays the group so-called "capitated" (or set amount)
fees, and the group, in turn, pays its participating physicians base sala-
ries and bonuses. 2 Finally, the group may still maintain relations with
its private patients, adding a fee-for-services component to its
practice.33
The final model is the "independent practice association" (IPA)
model.34 Under this model, the HMO contracts with an independent
physician group, usually a partnership or corporation comprised of in-
dependent practicing physicians, that in turn provides services to the
HMO enrollees.35 In this model, physicians practice in their own sep-
26. Michael Kanute, Comment, Evolving Theories of Malpractice Liability for HMOs, 20
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 842 (1989).
27. Id. at 844; see also Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Man-
aged Care Organizations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETmcS 223, 224 (1995) (summarizing the structural
features of HMOs that maximize the ethical treatment of patients).
28. Kanute, supra note 26, at 842-43 (citing J. MICHAELS, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE FEE-FOR-
SERVICE/PREPAID MEDICAL GROUP Vi (1982)).
29. William A. Chittenden, III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History
and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 452 (1991).
30. Kanute, supra note 26, at 843 (citing MICHAELS, supra note 28, at v); see also DONALD
K. FREEBORN & CLYDE R. POPE, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE IN MANAGED CARE: THE PRE-
PAID GROUP PRACTICE MODEL 21 (1994) (describing the HMO "group model").
31. See Christensen, supra note 27, at 225 (noting that some HMOs act as independent
contractors).
32. Id. at 224.
33. Kanute, supra note 26, at 843 (citing MICHAELS, supra note 28, at v).
34. Chittenden, supra note 29, at 452.
35. G. WHITIED & P. TORRENS, MANAGING CORPORATE HEALTH CARE EXPENSES 256
(1986).
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arate facilities and many times continue to practice outside of the
HMO. 36 The HMO pays the IPA a capitation fee, and the IPA com-
pensates the participating physicians based on separate contracts be-
tween the IPA and the individual physicians. 37 Therefore, the HMO
has no direct employment relationship with the medical provider.
II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, liability may be imposed
on a "blameless" person for the conduct of the tortfeasor based on
that person's relationship to the tortfeasor.38 Depending on the de-
gree of control exercised by HMOs over member-physicians under
any of the three models,39 North Carolina courts could hold HMOs
vicariously liable. Like hospitals, n° HMOs can be subject to vicarious
liability claims based on three tort theories: (1) respondeat superior,
(2) apparent agency, and (3) nondelegable duties.4 "
A. Respondeat Superior
The most common example of vicarious liability involves the theory
of respondeat superior.n2 Under this doctrine, the master may be held
liable for torts committed by the servant or employee who acts within
the scope of his or her employment.43 The justification for this doc-
trine is based on the deliberate allocation of risk. 4  That is, as a practi-
cal matter, the employer should incur the risk of loss because it can
better absorb and distribute the cost to society at large. 5 In North
Carolina, courts must address two important questions in determining
whether HMOs are vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
36. Chittenden, supra note 29, at 452.
37. See Diana J. Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Man-
aged Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 293 (1995) (discussing the theory of vicari-
ous liability in the context of managed care and analyzing cases applying the theory).
38. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 69 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining and illustrating vicarious liability); CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK
W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 23.10 (1991) (defining vicarious liability).
39. See supra Part I (discussing the three types of HMO models).
40. See generally DAVID A. LOGAN AND WALTER A. LOGAN, NORTH CAROLINA TORTS
§ 12.10, at 280-85 (1996) (discussing vicarious liability of hospitals for the acts of physician-
agents).
41. See Mark S. Mandell, Hospital Liability: Four Theories, TRIAL, May 1992, at 16, 17.
42. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, § 69, at 499-501 (explaining and illustrating
respondeat superior); see also DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 38, § 23.20, at 385-391 (explaining
and illustrating respondeat superior).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (stating that an employer will be
held liable for an employee acting within the scope of employment); see also DAE AND MOR-
RIS, supra note 38, § 23.20, at 387 ("Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable only when the employee's tortious conduct is within the scope of his employment..
44. KEETON ET. AL., supra note 38, § 69, at 500-501.
45. Id.
1997-98]
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superior: (1) whether the tortfeasor is an employee or independent
contractor of the HMO; and (2) if the tortfeasor is an employee,
whether he was acting within the scope of his employment. 46
A logical starting point is an inquiry into whether the tortfeasor is
an employee. According to the decision of the court in Wood v.
Miller,47 an employer-employee relationship exists where the em-
ployer "retains the right to control and direct the manner in which the
details of the work are to be executed.""8 In addition, North Carolina
courts have identified other factors in determining whether an em-
ployer-employee relationship exists. The factors are whether the per-
son employed: (1) possessed special skills, knowledge or training in
the execution of the work; (2) could use assistants he or she thought
proper; (3) had full control over his or her assistants; and (4) selected
his or her own time for doing the work. 9 While the North Carolina
Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o particular one of these factors is
decisive in itself,"5 the key question still remains: whether the em-
ployer controlled or had the right to control the manner in which the
alleged tortfeasor conducted his or her work.51
In North Carolina, a hospital, either charitable or for-profit, may be
held liable for the negligence of a physician acting as its agent during
the agency.52 If the hospital did not employ the physician but merely
granted privileges to use hospital facilities, or if the physician did not
perform any act within the general course of employment at the time
of alleged injury, then, North Carolina courts will not find the hospital
vicariously liable because the physician is not the hospital's agent.53
In contrast, because an HMO supposedly exercises less control over
its physicians than a hospital might exercise, liability under a theory of
respondeat superior remains more difficult to establish.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (stating the elements for respon-
deat superior); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, § 69, at 499-500 (discussing the principle
of respondeat superior); see also DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 38, § 23.20, at 385 (defining the
principle of respondeat superior).
47. 226 N.C. 567, 39 S.E. 608 (1946). See also DAYE AND MORRIS, supra note 38, § 23.20, at
386 (comparing an employee to an independent contractor).
48. Wood, 226 N.C. at 569, 39 S.E.2d at 609.
49. Doud v. K & G Janitorial Service, 69 N.C. App. 205,211-212, 316 S.E.2d 664, 669 (1984)
(quoting Hayes v. Board of Trustees Elon College, 224 N.C. 11, 16, 29 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1944)).
50. Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380, 385, 364 S.E.2d 433, 438
(1988).
51. Id. at 384, 363 S.E.2d at 437.
52. Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 21, 152 S.E.2d 485, 499 (1967). See
also Willoughby v. Wilkins, 65 N.C. App. 626, 634-637, 310 S.E.2d 90, 95-96 (1983) (finding that
respondeat superior could apply when the physician had contract of employment with the hospi-
tal; the contract guaranteed a specified number of days of leave; the work schedule was subject
to the hospital's approval; and the physician promised not to maintain a private practice).
53. Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 14 S.E.2d 643 (1941).
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In light of the control test required under North Carolina law, the
vicarious liability of an HMO for the torts of its physician rests on the
structure of the organization. Staff model HMOs are most vulnerable
to the respondeat superior argument because they directly employ
their physicians.54  Aside from the general degree of control, other
factors indicative of the application of respondeat superior include the
compensation of wages,55 the ownership of the instrumentalities used
to deliver the health care to patients,56 and the language used in con-
tracts.57 Like staff model HMOs, a group model HMO could lend
itself to liability if similar factors are found in the organizational struc-
ture. These factors include capitation payments to the group, the phy-
sicians' use of the HMO's facilities in delivering care to enrolled
patients, and the HMO's control over referrals to the physicians.58
With the IPA model, however, it is much less likely that North Car-
olina courts will find a HMO vicariously liable for the actions of the
medical professional. Physicians usually maintain a separate private
practice apart from the health plan members and therefore are consid-
ered independent contractors.59 In Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc.,6' the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that an HMO which operates as an
IPA model is not subject to vicarious liability based on respondeat
superior.61 The Raglin court reasoned that an IPA model HMO does
not directly employ its own physicians; instead, the HMO contracts
with independent medical groups who, in turn, employ individual
54. See Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). In
this case, a staff model HMO attempted to avoid liability by claiming that its physicians practiced
medicine independently. Moreover, it argued that, as a corporation, it was not entitled to prac-
tice medicine under state common law. Id. at 1108. The court rejected the latter argument
holding that "[t]he circumstances establish an employment relationship where the employee per-
formed acts within the scope of his employment." Id. at 1109. The court also evaluated the
structure of the HMO, emphasizing that the physician had signed an "employment contract" and
that the physicians were compensated on a salary basis and had agreed not to practice outside
the HMO. Id. at 1105. Cf. Willoughby, 65 N.C. App. at 626, 310 S.E.2d at 90 (holding that an
employment relationship could exist between a hospital and physician when the physician had a
contract of employment with the hospital).
55. See Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174,177 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (iden-
tifying payment of wages as one of several factors in establishing "master-servant" relationship);
see also Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 37, at 301 (noting that payments are more similar to
salaries than fee-for-service payments).
56. Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 37, at 301-302.
57. Id. at 302 (suggesting that contractual language between the HMO and the enrollee that
places the HMO in the position of preapproving physician recommendations for hospitalization
or tests might support a finding that the HMO has sufficient control for the imposition of
liability).
58. See Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding an
HMO liable because the physician was not free to accept or reject particular patients, and the
physician examined patient at HMO's office).
59. Raglin v. HMO Illinois Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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providers.62 Therefore, the Raglin court considered the medical
groups and their employee-providers as independent contractors in
relationship to the HMO.6 3
Nonetheless, commentators have suggested that an IPA model
could be liable if it exercised a sufficient amount of control over the
provider.64 Many IPA model HMOs, for example, use such methods
as preauthorization of hospital admissions, patient reviews, and
credentialing programs. 65 Thus, the applicability of respondeat supe-
rior will depend on the North Carolina courts' analysis of the particu-
lar relationship between the HMO and its physicians.
B. Apparent Agency
Compared to the theory of respondeat superior, where the element
of control is essential, the concept of apparent or ostensible agency
66emphasizes appearances. The apparent agency theory is based on
Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services
are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor
in supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer
were supplying them himself or by his servants.67
Thus, this doctrine focuses on the patient's expectations as to the
source of treatment. In North Carolina, an HMO subscriber must sat-
isfy three elements to establish vicarious liability through the doctrine
of apparent agency.68 First, the patient must look to the institution,
rather than the individual physician, for health care.69 Second, the
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Chittenden, supra note 29, at 456 (arguing that HMOs should be liable where
control exists over physicians).
65. Id. at 456-57.
66. See Earlene P. Weiner, N6te, Managed Health Care: HMO Corporate Liability, In-
dependent Contractors, and the Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 15 J. CORP. L. 535, 546 (1990) (not-
ing that the crucial determinant under principles of apparent agency is whether the agent
appears to act on behalf of the principal).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF
AGENCY § 267 (1958), which provides:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third
person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability
to the third person for harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a
servant or other agent as if he were such.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965) (defining the apparent agency the-
ory); cf. Hoffman v. Moore Regional Hosp., Inc., 114 N.C. App. 248, 441 S.E.2d 567, disc. rev.
denied, 336 N.C. 605, 447 S.E.2d 391 (1994) (stating that a hospital may be held vicariously liable
based upon the doctrine of apparent agency where the hospital represented to the patient that
the doctor was its agent and the patient relied on the representation).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965).
9
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HMO must "hold out" the physician as its employee. 7° Finally, the
patient must have justifiably relied upon the HMO in some way on
this belief.71
Since the physician's status as an employee or independent contrac-
tor does not determine liability, the apparent agency doctrine of vica-
rious liability can apply to all three HMO models.72 This doctrine is
especially attractive to plaintiffs attempting to impute liability to an
IPA model HMO, which is not subject to liability based on respondeat
superior. In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,73 the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that an IPA model HMO may be subject
to vicarious liability even though the health care provider acted as an
independent contractor.74 In this case, the plaintiff and his wife par-
ticipated in a health care plan offered by the defendant HMO.75 The
defendant's health plan limited its subscribers' choice of physicians to
those names provided in a directory.76 When the plaintiff's wife found
a lump in her breast, she contacted her primary-care HMO physician.
He referred the plaintiff's wife to a specialist, who also participated in
the defendant HMO. 77 As a result of the specialist's negligent per-
formance of a breast biopsy and the primary care physician's misdiag-
nosis, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack and died.78
The Boyd court began its opinion by acknowledging that the theory
of apparent agency had been recognized and applied in the hospital
setting.7 9 In applying this theory to the IPA model HMO, the court
outlined the two elements of the doctrine: (1) whether the patient
looked to the institution rather than the individual physician for care;
and (2) whether the HMO held the physician out as an employee.8 0
The court then applied the facts to these two elements. The Boyd
court concluded that the plaintiff's wife submitted herself to the care
of her primary-care physician as a result of an invitation from the
HMO.8 The court cited several factors to prove that the plaintiff rea-
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). Cf Hoffman, 114 N.C. App. at 252,
407 S.E.2d at 570 (holding that plaintiff had not relied on any representation where there was no
evidence that she would have done anything differently had she known that the doctor was not
an employee of the hospital).
72. Weiner, supra note 66, at 546.
73. 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
74. Id. at 1235.
75. Id. at 1229.
76. Id. at 1230.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1231.
80. Id. at 1232 (quoting Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980).
81. Id. at 1235.
1997-981
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sonably could have looked to the defendant HMO for her medical
care, and that she believed the HMO "held out" the physician as its
employee.82 First, the court emphasized the HMO's advertising and
marketing campaign which presented the organization as "a total care
program. '83 Moreover, the court noted that the HMO advertised its
rigorous selection and accreditation process for physician providers.'
Finally, the court observed that the primary-care physician's role was
defined as the "gatekeeper into the health care delivery system. 85
That is, an HMO enrollee can see an HMO-listed specialist only upon
referral by the enrollee's primary-care physician. 6 The court rea-
soned that because the plaintiff "was required to follow the mandates
of [the] HMO and did not directly seek the attention of the specialist,
there is an inference that [plaintiff] looked to the institution for care
and not solely to the physicians. "87 Thus, the court concluded the
plaintiff could maintain an action against the HMO based on the the-
ory that the specialist was the HMO's apparent agent.88
In contrast to Pennsylvania law, North Carolina's doctrine of appar-
ent agency is based upon the patient's justifiable reliance upon repre-
sentation.89 As applied in a hospital setting, the critical inquiry is
whether the patient would have elected to seek treatment elsewhere
or done anything differently had the patient known the physician was
not an employee of the hospital.90 Likewise, to hold an HMO vicari-
ously liable through apparent agency in North Carolina, the plaintiff
must pay particular attention to the reliance element.
C. Non-delegable Duty
Aside from respondeat superior or agency concepts, North Carolina
courts may use another tool to hold an HMO vicariously liable for a
physician's malpractice: the non-delegable duty doctrine. Applying
this doctrine, HMOs could be liable for their member-physicians' mal-
practice since HMOs have a non-delegable duty to provide quality
medical care.91
82. Id. at 1232-33.
83. Id. at 1232, n.6.
84. Id. at 1233.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1235.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Hoffman, 114 N.C. App. at 252, 441 S.E.2d at 570.
90. Id.
91. Some attorneys associate the doctrine of "duty" with direct liability based in negligence.
In fact, Daye and Morris note this ambiguity: "In some of the cases purporting to apply these
exceptions, it appears that the employer's liability is actually based on his own negligence rather
than negligence imputed to him under the doctrine of respondeat superior." However, it can be
properly classified as a vicarious liability concept because the basis for the liability stems from
11
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North Carolina courts have recognized that the non-delegable duty
reflects the public policy demands that certain obligations are of such
importance that employers should not be shielded from liability.92 In
Medley v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections,9 3 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the state has a non-delegable duty to provide
adequate medical services to inmates.94 The court reasoned that the
public has a duty to take care of the prisoner, "who cannot by reason
of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." 95
The most notable non-delegable duty case involving the health care
setting is Jackson v. Power.96 In this case, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a hospital has an independent and non-delegable duty to
provide non-negligent medical care in its emergency room.97
Although the physician was classified as an independent contractor,
the court held the hospital vicariously liable for the doctor's malprac-
tice because a hospital's duty to provide proper non-negligent care is
similar to the common carrier's non-delegable duty of safety to its
passengers. 98
North Carolina courts could look to the non-delegable duty analysis
in Jackson, which would protect patients from substandard care. In
North Carolina, the importance of providing adequate medical serv-
ices to inmates under Medley rivals the importance of HMO providing
proper health care. As discussed below, North Carolina courts have
already stated concerns about health care quality and have imposed
certain duties on hospitals to guarantee patient safety.9 9 Therefore, in
North Carolina, patients subscribing to HMOs could be as deserving
of protection from inadequate medical care as inmates in a prison.
the tort of another. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 38, § 23.31, at 393. See also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 38, § 71, at 511 (also noting that non-delegable duty is a vicarious liability concept).
92. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 38, § 23.31, at 392-93; see Royal v. Dodd, 177 N.C. 206,
209-11, 98 S.E. 599, 600-02 (1919) (observing that certain dangers raise the duty which the em-
ployer can not escape liability); see generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, § 71, at 512 ("It is
difficult to suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable duty character of such duties may be
determined, other than the conclusion of the courts that the responsibility is so important to the
community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another.").
93. 330 N.C. 837, 412 S.E.2d 654 (1992).
94. Id. at 330 N.C. at 845, 412 S.E.2d at 659.
95. Id. at 842, 412 S.E.2d at 657-58 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132
S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
96. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
97. Id. at 1385.
98. Id. at 1384.
99. See Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Hosp. 319 N.C. 372, 375, 353 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1987)
(stating that a hospital may be liable if it has breached a duty of care it owes to a patient); see
also DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 38, § 23.40, at 396-97 (observing that hospitals have a duty to
use reasonable care in the treatment of their patients).
.1997-98]
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III. DIRECT LIABILITY FOR MEMBER-PHYSICIAN MALPRACTICE
In North Carolina, HMOs should face direct liability under three
theories. First, HMOs should face direct liability for tortious conduct
under the doctrine of corporate negligence. Furthermore, HMOs
should be held directly liable for patients' injuries when the injuries
are caused by the HMO's negligent selection or retention of an incom-
petent member-physician. Finally, HMOs should be held directly lia-
ble where utilization review procedures cause patient harm.
A. The Duty of Patient Care
The early perspective under North Carolina law recognized that
hospitals provided facilities rather than services. 100 Early cases, for
example, imposed a duty on hospitals to provide appropriate equip-
ment. 10 1 As the role of hospitals expanded to include full-service
treatment, patients began to look to institutions rather than individual
physicians as health care providers. Responding to the public's chang-
ing view of hospital duties, the North Carolina Court of Appeals ex-
panded the "corporate negligence" doctrine of direct liability in Bost
v. Riley.1°2 The court stated:
In contrast to the vicarious nature of respondeat superior, the doctrine
of "corporate negligence" involves the violation of a duty owed di-
rectly by the hospital to the patient. Prior to modem times, a hospital
undertook, "only to furnish room, food, facilities for operation, and
attendants, and [was held] not liable for damages resulting from the
negligence of a physician in the absence of evidence of agency, or
other facts upon which the principle of respondeat superior [could
have been] applied." In contrast, today's hospitals regulate their med-
ical staffs to a much greater degree and play a much more active role
in furnishing patients medical treatment. 10 3
More recently, the North Carolina courts elaborated on these reasons
for expanding the doctrine of corporate negligence to include direct
liability of a hospital for patient care. First, a hospital's general obli-
gation to "make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treat-
ment" of a patient includes a duty to obtain informed consent from
100. See Smith v. Duke Univ. 219 N.C. 628, 634, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941) (holding that a
hospital only has a duty "to furnish room, food, facilities for operation, and attendance, and is
not liable for damages resulting from the negligence of a physician in the absence of evidence of
agency.") (citations omitted).
101. See Payne v. Garvey, 264 N.C. 593, 595, 142 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1965) (hospital has a duty
to provide standard equipment, to inspect the equipment, and to correct any defects); see also
Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 421, 221 S.E.2d 733, 736
(1976) (holding that institutions must provide equipment reasonably suited for the intended
use), overruled by Harris v. Miller, 335 N.C. 379, 438 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
102. 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 S.E.2d 621 (1980).
103. Id. at 645, 262 S.E.2d at 395 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the patient before a risky medical procedure.10 Second, there is a
duty to set up an effective mechanism for the immediate reporting of
any situation that created a threat to the health of a patient. °5
Under the doctrine of corporate negligence, then, a plaintiff could
argue that an HMO must satisfy the duty to guarantee that its health
care providers are delivering sufficient medical services. Statutory
requirements subject HMOs to the duty to monitor the quality of pa-
tient services. Federally-qualified HMOs must have quality assurance
programs which allow them to review the health care provided to pa-
tients.10 6 Furthermore, an HMO may have marketed a quality assur-
ance program to attract new patients.
B. The Duty to Properly Select and Retain Medical Staff
North Carolina courts have recognized that health care institutions
have a duty to act prudently when selecting an employee or agent.
The leading case on this issue is Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital, Inc.1°7 In Blanton, the defendant hospital negligently per-
formed three operations on the plaintiff."0 ' The plaintiff sued the
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital for negligently granting clinical
privileges to a doctor to perform operations without investigating
whether the doctor was qualified to perform them.109 At the trial
court level, the defendant prevailed because the plaintiff failed to
state a claim for relief."' However, the Court of Appeals reversed."'
In affirming the appellate court's ruling, the North Carolina
Supreme Court relied on the general evolution of the law and the hos-
pital's own actions.1 2 The court found that the hospital should be
held liable for negligence because it allowed an unqualified doctor to
104. Campbell v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 314, 325, 352 S.E.2d 902, 908
(1987), aff'd by an equally divided court, 321 N.C. 260, 265-66, 362 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1987), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
But see Clark v. Perry, 114 N.C. App. 297, 442 S.E.2d 57 (1994) (holding that the court has yet to
extend the doctrine of corporate negligence in order to impose upon a hospital the duty to
obtain a patient's informed consent before treatment when the patient is admitted by a private
physician for surgery).
105. Campbell, 84 N.C. App. at 322, 352 S.E.2d at 907.
106. The United States Code states that "each HMO shall ... (6) have organizational ar-
rangements, established in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, for an ongoing quality
assurance program for its health services which program (A) stress health outcomes, and (B)
provides review by physicians and other health professionals of the process followed in the pro-
vision of health services." 42 U.S.C. 300(c)(6)(1994).
107. 319 N.C. at 372, 354 S.E.2d at 455.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 373, 354 S.E.2d at 456.
110. Id. at 372, 354 S.E.2d at 455.
111. 78 N.C. App. 502, 337 S.E.2d 200 (1985).
112. Blanton, 319 N.C. at 374-75, 354 S.E.2d at 457-58.
1997-98]
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perform operations in the hospital.113 In addition, the court found
that the hospital failed to abide by the enforcement standards of the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, which ensures
quality patient care.1 14 Finally, the court noted that the hospital per-
mitted an unqualified physician to perform surgery without requiring
that the physician be supervised or assisted by a properly qualified
member of its medical staff.1 15 As a result of this landmark decision,
the Blanton court established the appropriate framework for deter-
mining whether liability for negligent selection exists.
North Carolina courts have limited the standard of care in physician
selection to hospitals. However, a Missouri court was the first to rec-
ognize that HMOs have a similar duty to use reasonable care when
choosing their member-physicians. In Harrell v. Total Health Care,
Inc.,"6 the plaintiff patient, a member of an HMO, consulted her
HMO primary-care physician for treatment of urinary stress inconti-
nence."' After examining the patient, the primary-care physician de-
cided that the patient should see a urologist.1 18 According to the
HMO regulations, the primary-care physician selected a urologist
from a directory provided by the HMO. 119 Subsequently, the urolo-
gist negligently performed surgery on the patient.' 20 As a result, the
patient brought an action against the HMO under the corporate negli-
gence theory. 12
1
The Harrell court evaluated the HMO's physician-approval proce-
dure. In the early stages of the process, the HMO would mail invita-
tional brochures to potential doctors, and would then send an
application to any doctors who wanted to participate. 122 This applica-
tion procedure differed depending on whether the applicant was a pri-
mary-care physician or specialist. 23  A six-member credential
committee evaluated the application for irregularities when the appli-
cant was a primary-care physician.124 A three-member committee an-
alyzed the application in a similar manner when the applicant was a
specialist.' 25 Both committees failed to look at applicant's standing in
the medical community, conduct interviews of the applicant, or check
113. Id. at 376, 354 S.E.2d at 458.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 377, 354 S.E.2d at 458.
116. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 60.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 59.
122. Id. at 60.
123. Id. at 59-60.
124. Id. at 59.
125. Id.
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references.12 6 The committees only determined whether the applicant
possessed a medical license, had admitting privileges at some hospi-
tals, and could prescribe drugs.1 7 In other words, the HMO would
accept a physician unless the application seemed abnormal.2 8
As a result of this practice, the Harrell court held that the HMO
was potentially liable for the negligent selection of the urologist who
negligently performed surgery on the plaintiff.129 The court reasoned:
In this arrangement where Total Health Care collects a premium for
the expense of medical care and limits the choice by the subscriber to
physicians acceptable to Total Health Care, there is an unreasonable
risk of harm to subscribers if the physicians listed by Total Health
Care include doctors who are unqualified or incompetent. The pres-
ence of that risk gives rise to a common law duty owed by Total
Health Care to conduct a reasonable investigation of physicians to as-
certain their reputation in the medical community for competence.' 30
The language used by the Harrell court is very similar to the reason-
ing found in Blanton. Both the Blanton court and the Harrell court
found liability of health care institutions under the corporate negli-
gence doctrine. 13 1 By applying the legal principles of these cases,
North Carolina courts could hold HMOs directly liable for failing to
adequately select physicians.
C. Utilization Review
North Carolina courts could also hold HMOs liable for utilization
review. As discussed in the Introduction, HMOs are profitable and
attractive to consumers because they can cut medical care costs; how-
ever, HMO cost-cutting schemes can also harm patient care. 132 The
primary cost-containment method used by HMOs is utilization re-
view.13 3 There are two types of utilization review. The first is pro-
spective review or precertification, which mandates a physician to
126. Id.
127. Id. at 61.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 59.
130. Id. at 63.
131. Compare Blanton, 319 N.C. at 373, 354 S.E.2d at 457 (holding that hospital had a duty to
exercise reasonable care in retention and selection of medical staff and duty to periodically re-
view and monitor staff's competency) with Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 59 (deciding that risk of harm
to patients gives rise to common-law duty to conduct reasonable investigation of member-physi-
cians' competency).
132. See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
133. Utilization management system includes various techniques: (1) utilization review; (2)
identifying quality and cost efficient providers, (3) monitoring treatment, (4) designing benefit
plans that "channel" patients to low-cost, quality providers, and (5) encouraging cost-conscious-
ness among plan members. Richard A. Hinden & Douglas L. Elden, Liability Issues for Man-
aged Care Entities. The Dark Side of Health Care Containment. Emerging Legal Issues in
Managed Care, 14 SETON HALL LEGis. J. 1, 51 (1990).
1997-98]
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contact an HMO representative before admitting a patient to a hospi-
tal.'3 4 With this review, an HMO representative or so-called "gate-
keeper" approves or denies the request for admission and limits the
length of stay for the patient in the hospital. 135 The second type of
review is the notification scheme; this requires the physician to contact
the HMO for concurrent review, both before admitting a patient to
the hospital and during the patient's hospital stay.136
In 1986, the Court of Appeals of California recognized HMO liabil-
ity based on utilization review. In Wickline v. California,1 37 the plain-
tiff patient, with back and leg problems, sought treatment from her
physician.'38 Due to an unsuccessful physical therapy, the physician
sent the patient to the hospital and consulted a vascular surgeon.139
The specialist diagnosed the plaintiff with a disease called Leriche's
Syndrome and concluded that the plaintiff needed surgery.140
The plaintiff patient received medical assistance under the Califor-
nia medical assistance known as Medi-Cal.' 4 ' Like many HMOs, this
program employed a notification program which required the ap-
proval of the doctor's diagnosis and authorization for both the pa-
tient's admission to a hospital and the recommended surgery. 42
Medi-Cal authorized the plaintiff for ten days of initial hospitaliza-
tion.'4 3 After the surgery, the plaintiff experienced complications that
resulted in two more surgeries, and the physician requested an eight-
day hospital extension.'" The Medi-Cal consultant, a general sur-
geon, denied the request and granted a four-day extension based only
on the information provided by a Medi-Cal nurse over the phone.145
After her discharge, the plaintiff's condition deteriorated; she lost
circulation in her leg and developed a major infection. 146 The physi-
cian unsuccessfully attempted to treat the infection with medica-
tion.147 As a result, the physician amputated the patient's leg.148 In
the treating physician's expert medical opinion, the patient's leg
134. Paul J. Feldstein et. al., Private Cost Containment: The Effects of Utilization Review
Programs on Health Care Use and Expenditures, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED., 1310, 1311 (1988).
135. Hinden & Elden, supra note 133, at 52.
136. Id.
137. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986), rev'd and superseded, 727 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986), cert.
dismissed and remanded, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987).
138. Id. at 812.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 813.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 816.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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would not have been amputated if the eight-day extension had been
granted since the circulatory problems and infection would have been
discovered and treated at the initial stage.
149
In her complaint, plaintiff Wickline alleged that the State of Califor-
nia negligently caused her early release from the hospital by ending
her medical eligibility according to its utilization review process.
150
The Court of Appeals of California overturned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, holding that the defendant could not be held liable for
the plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law.151 The court based its deci-
sion on three factors. First, the court found that the plaintiff's dis-
charge after the four-day extension complied with the standard of care
for physicians in the community.' 52 Second, the court found that the
statute regulating Medi-Cal allowed the use of utilization reviews
which denied benefits "in accordance with the usual standards of med-
ical practice in the community.' 153  Third, the court found that the
utilization review used by Medi-Cal was not the determinative cause
of the plaintiff's injuries since her doctor could have extended her hos-
pital stay if he considered it necessary.'54 Although the court did not
impose liability on the defendant, it noted that:
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care
which should have been provided is not provided should recover for
the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the deprivation of
such care, including, when appropriate, health care payors. Third
party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the de-
sign or implementation of cost-containment mechanisms .... 155
Therefore, the Wickline case left the door open that a health care
payor, such as an HMO, may be held directly liable where improper
utilization reviews cause harm to its plan members.
Four years after Wickline, the Court of Appeals of California re-
jected the restrictive causation analysis in Wilson v. Blue Cross.'56 In
Wilson, the plaintiff, who suffered from depression, drug dependency,
and anorexia, entered the hospital seeking help.' 57 The physician de-
termined that the plaintiff needed three to four weeks of hospitaliza-
tion.' 58  After ten days of treatment, the defendant insurance
149. Id. at 817.
150. Id. at 811.
151. Id. at 818.
152. Id. at 818-819.
153. Id. at 819.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
157. Id. at 877.
158. Id.
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company informed the doctor that it would not pay for any further
hospital care. 159 Because the patient could not afford the further care,
he was discharged from the hospital. 6 ° Twenty days later, the patient
committed suicide.' 6 '
The plaintiff's parents brought an action against the insurance com-
pany and the treating physician.' 62 Although the defendant argued
that public policy warrants the protection of health care entities which
conducted utilization reviews, the court distinguished this situation
from Wickline.163 In this case, the court noted that no statutory au-
thority required the use of such procedures.'" More importantly, the
Wilson court rejected the Wickline causation reasoning and applied
the causation analysis found in section 431 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.165 Under this Restatement principle, an "actor's...
conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if ... his conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm .... 166 In Wilson, the
court held that the insurance company's decision to deny further hos-
pitalization was, in fact, a "substantial factor in bringing about the de-
cedent's demise. '167 Thus, the defendant insurance company could be
found directly liable because denial of further hospitalization created
a triable issue as to whether the insurance company's action was "a
substantial factor in the patient's death.' 68 Accordingly, summary
judgment was inappropriate in this case. 1 69
Of course, it is uncertain if these cases would have any effect on
North Carolina law. However, North Carolina courts have applied
the substantial-factor causation analysis in other contexts, although it
has never adopted the Restatement. 70 In Brown v. Neal,'7' the court
discussed the legal cause in a case involving a motorcycle accident:
The doctrine of proximate cause which determines the existence of
liability for negligence is especially applicable to liability for a particu-
lar items of damage. To hold a defendant responsible for plaintiff's
injuries, defendant's negligence must have been a substantial factor,
159. Id.
160. Id. at 877-78.
161. Id. at 878.
162. Id. at 880.
163. Id. at 884.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 883. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) (explaining standard for
determining point at which actor's negligent conduct meets the legal cause of harm to another).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
167. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
168. Id. at 884-85.
169. Id. at 885.
170. Hedrick v. Rains, 344 N.C. 729, 477 S.E.2d 171 (1996) (per curiam).
171. 283 N.C. 604, 197 S.E.2d 505 (1973).
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that is, a proximate cause of the particular injuries for which plaintiff
seeks recovery.
172
Therefore, if a North Carolina HMO's cost-containment scheme in-
jures a patient, the HMO could be liable through the Wickline-Wilson
legal analysis and North Carolina causation principles.
V. DEFENSES TO TORT LIABILITY
A. ERISA Preemption
The primary defense to imposing liability on an HMO for substan-
dard patient care is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"). 7 3 In 1974, Congress passed ERISA in order to establish
uniform national standards for employee benefit plans and preempted
state regulation of these plans. Congress adopted this law mainly be-
cause of its concern that corrupt, incompetent pension managers were
squandering the money entrusted to them.174 While ERISA sets strin-
gent standards for employee benefit plans, the law also severely limits
the remedies available to workers. 75 In fact, ERISA has been enor-
mously successful, with ERISA plans now the leading source of pay-
ment for health services nationwide. It is estimated that three out of
four managed care plans are ERISA-qualified.176
1. Pertinent Sections of ERISA: 502(a)(1)(B) and 514(a)
ERISA provides two methods for preemption that bar state courts
and legislatures from holding a defendant HMO liable for negligence.
Section 502(a) provides members of benefit plans with a private cause
of action against their insurer regarding delivery of benefits. 77 Under
section 502(a)(1)(B), a plan member can bring a civil action in federal
or state court for three reasons: (1) to recover benefits due to him or
her under the plan's terms; (2) to enforce his or her rights under the
plan's terms; or (3) to clarify his or her rights to future benefits under
the plan's terms.'7 8 After the member's claim is made, the court de-
termines if the cause of action falls into one of these three categories
of complaints. 179 If the claim satisfies one of these requirements,
172. Id. at 611, 192 S.E.2d at 509 (emphasis added) (quoting Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C.
317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965)).
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
174. Robert Pear, Judges Deplore Law That Shields HMOs, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at Al.
175. Id.
176. Barry R. Furrow, Symposium Article: Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury:
Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 494 (1997).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
179. See Seema R. Shah, Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical
Malpractice Claims: A Response to Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80 MirNN. L. REv. 1545,
1997-98]
20
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol23/iss1/5
78 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:58
ERISA completely preempts it.' 8° As a result of this preemption, the
member is provided very limited remedies.
The second preemption provision is found in Section 514(a). It ex-
pressly states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan...." 181  Whether a state claim "relates to" an employee benefit
plan has been the subject of many court decisions.182 However, an
exception to section 514(a), known as the "savings clause," '183 allows
state laws regulating insurance to get around this preemption. None-
theless, the "deemer clause,' 184 precludes this interpretation by man-
dating that self-insured employee benefit plans qualified under
ERISA cannot "be deemed to be an insurance company or other in-
surer ... ."185
Because ERISA statutes are sometimes confusing, an example of
how an HMO defendant would utilize an ERISA preemption clause
should be helpful. Assume that the plaintiff has health coverage
through her HMO, which she received as part of a benefits package
from her employer. 186 Her ears have been hurting for some time. A
physician for the HMO concludes that the plaintiff's ears suffer from
wax build-up and cleans her ears by injecting a solution from a syringe
into her ear canals.'87 As an HMO technician injects the solution into
the plaintiff's left ear, the plaintiff hears a loud, popping sound and
feels some pain.188 Later, the plaintiff visits another doctor who in-
forms her that her eardrum was punctured and she would suffer from
permanent disability because of the wrong diagnosis. 189
The plaintiff sues the HMO in state court, claiming negligence on
the state common law theory of vicarious liability. 190 That is, the
1547 (1996) (providing a perspective on ERISA's uniformity goals through an administrative
cost analysis).
180. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that ERISA did
not preempt plaintiff's vicarious liability malpractice claim against U.S. Healthcare).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
182. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (deciding that a state law
"relates to" an employee benefit plan if it has "a connection with or reference to such a plan.");
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990) (noting that "the preemption clause is conspic-
uous for its breadth"); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(holding that a state law is not precluded from preemption even if it is consistent with ERISA's
regulations).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
185. Id.
186. The facts of this example are loosely based on the case of Haas v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D. I11. 1994).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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HMO is liable for the negligent action of its employee, the physician.
Because the plaintiff's health coverage was part of an employee bene-
fit plan, the HMO asserts that ERISA governs and preempts the
plaintiff's state law claim.191 The HMO removes the case to federal
court for resolution of the preemption issue. 192
2. Vicarious Liability Claims Against HMOs
At this point, federal courts are split.' 9 3 Some courts have held that
ERISA does preempt the plaintiff's vicarious liability claim. In such
case, the plaintiff is unable to proceed in her claim against the HMO
for the physician's negligence. Consequently, the plaintiff must resort
to suing the physician directly for negligence. In taking this approach,
the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the negligent physician's personal
assets and insurance coverage. These sources are often times insuffi-
cient to compensate the plaintiff for the injury she suffered.194 Fortu-
nately, in spite of the disagreements among federal courts concerning
ERISA preemption, a federal district court in North Carolina is ame-
nable to vicarious liability suits by the plaintiff.'95
Before discussing the North Carolina case, it is important to first
review the influential decision of Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare.196 Dukes
marks the first time a circuit court addressed whether an HMO may
be held vicariously liable for negligence of its physicians.' 97 In Dukes
the court discussed the application of preemption under section 502
and its relation to ERISA.' 98 The plaintiffs contended that the only
benefit received from the HMO was membership in the plan.1 99 On
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Compare Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 117-18 (D. Md. 1996) (allowing vicarious
liability action to proceed because ERISA did not preempt action against physicians and HMO
for physicians' failure to diagnose cancerous tumor) with Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 129-30
(D. N.J. 1994) (indicating that plaintiff's claim premised on vicarious liability with HMO were
preempted by ERISA).
194. It is important to note that many states do not mandate medical malpractice insurance.
Some doctors find the cost of malpractice too high and thus carry limited or no coverage. F.
Christopher Wethly, Note, New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.: Vicarious Liability Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care Organizations Es-
caping ERISA's Grasp, 37 B.C. L. REV. 813, 815 n.29 (1996). These physicians may simply de-
clare bankruptcy leaving the injured plaintiff with little compensation. Id.
195. As one author aptly notes, "The resultant uncertainty [of ERISA preemption] has led
to a situation in which a plaintiff bringing a malpractice suit against a managed care organization
might find that his or her recovery depends upon the fortuity of living in a particular district -
or indeed, appearing before a particular judge within that judicial district who is amenable to
such suits." Id. at 859.
196. 57 F. 3d at 350.
197. Natalie Zellner, Note, Duking It Out: Beating the Complete Preemption of ERISA
Under Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 942 (1998).
198. 57 F. 3d at 354-55.
199. Id. at 356.
1997-981
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the other hand, U.S. Healthcare, the defendant HMO, argued that the
definition of benefit is the medical care itself.2°° Therefore, con-
tended U.S. Healthcare, ERISA preempts the plaintiffs' claims. The
court held that "quality control of benefits, such as the health care
benefits provided here, is a field traditionally occupied by state regula-
tion and we interpret the silence of Congress as reflecting an intent
that it remain such."'201 In its reasoning, the court distinguished be-
tween plan-created rights to care and the right to adequate quality
care:
The plaintiffs are not attempting to define new "rights under the terms
of the plan"; instead, they are attempting to assert their already-ex-
isting rights under the generally-applicable state law of agency and tort.
Inherent in the phrases, "rights under the terms of the plan" and "ben-
efits due ... under the terms of the plan" is the notion that the plan
participants and beneficiaries will receive something to which they
would not be otherwise entitled. But patients enjoy the right to be
free from medical malpractice regardless of whether or not their medi-
cal care is provided through an ERISA plan. 2
The court noted the difference between the quantity of benefits prom-
ised under a welfare plan and the quality of those benefits.20 3 It ob-
served that the quality of care can be so substandard that it translates
into a denial of benefits.2 " For example, the plan could describe a
benefit in terms that are quality-based, such as a commitment that all
x-rays will be evaluated by radiologists with a certain level of training.
Therefore, the court concluded that the poor quality of medical care is
not a benefit issue under ERISA.2 °5
In North Carolina, a federal court case has echoed the reasoning
found in Duke. In Santitoro v. Evans,z°6 participants in health benefits
plans brought an action in state court against a physician and the
HMO which employed the physician.2 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant HMO should be vicariously liable for the conduct of the
physician under the theory of respondeat superior.20 8 The defendant
HMO argued that the claim should be removed to federal court and
preempted under ERISA.20 9 The court analyzed whether the plain-
tiffs' claim fell under section 502(a), which authorizes participants and
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 358-59.
206. 935 F. Supp. 733 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
207. Id. at 735.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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beneficiaries to bring an action to recover benefits under a plan.21 °
Using the same reasoning in Duke, the court said the plaintiffs' claim
did not fall within the purview of section 502(a) because it "relates to
quality, rather than quantity, of benefits plaintiffs received under the
plan."'211 The court concluded that the plaintiffs sought "to hold de-
fendants liable for breaches of duties related to medical care imposed
by state tort law, rather than breaches of the duties contractually im-
posed by the plans. '2 12
3. Direct Liability Claims Against HMOs
Few, if any, claims for direct malpractice negligence claims against
employer-sponsored HMOs have successfully skirted ERISA preemp-
tion.2 13 Recently, a federal district court in Virginia addressed a direct
negligence claim against an HMO based upon establishing and using a
financial incentives program.214 That is, the financial incentives pro-
gram rewarded physicians for not ordering tests or treatments.215 The
court ruled that ERISA preempts claims for direct negligence because
the claims are directly "related to" the administration and regulation
of the health care benefit plan.216 Furthermore, the court noted that
to allow these claims to proceed would oppose the congressional in-
tent behind ERISA.217
However, in Santitoro, the North Carolina federal district court did
not allow ERISA to preempt a direct negligence claim against the
HMO based on negligent hiring and retention of the physician.218
Compared to the Virginia federal court case, the Santitoro court noted
that the plaintiffs did not assert claims against the HMO for wrongful
administration under the health care benefit plan. 219 The Santitoro
court noted that the plaintiffs sought quite the opposite: they claimed
damages for the physicians' alleged medical malpractice and other
malfeasance related to the provision of those benefits.220 Therefore,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs sought to hold defendants liable
210. Id. at 736.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. Chrys A. Martin, Developments in Managed Care, SA93 AL-ABA 217, 221 (1996).
214. Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F.Supp.
1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
215. Id. at 1140.
216. Id. at 1150.
217. Id.
218. Santitoro, 935 F.Supp. at 737.
219. Id. at 736.
220. Id.
1997-98]
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for breaches of duties related to medical care imposed by state tort
law.221
While the Santitoro decision provides some hope for plaintiffs filing
lawsuits against North Carolina HMOs, many federal courts continue
to disagree on which kinds of medical errors trigger preemption and
which will allow a malpractice suit against a managed care organiza-
tion. It is for this exact reason that many federal judges are urging
Congress this year to consider changes to ERISA.222
B. Prohibition on the Corporate Practice of Medicine
The second barrier to liability is the statutory prohibition on the
corporate practice of medicine by HMOs. Specifically, section 58 of
the North Carolina General Statutes states that "[a]ny health mainte-
nance organization authorized . . . shall not be deemed to be practic-
ing medicine or dentistry and shall be exempt from the provisions...
relating to the practice of medicine and dentistry. "223
However, the corporate practice of medicine should not preclude
any recovery against an HMO for its physicians' malpractice. Specifi-
cally, North Carolina courts must reconcile this statute with the Blan-
ton2 24 decision, which allowed direct liability for hospitals.225
Furthermore, other courts have held that ERISA does not preempt
medical malpractice claims against HMOs based on apparent agency
or other vicarious liability theories.226 Therefore, statutory prohibi-
tions on the corporate practice of medicine by HMOs can be chal-
lenged on both vicarious liability and direct liability theories.
CONCLUSION
From this Comment, it is obvious that North Carolina courts have
many legal tools to hold HMOs liable. As managed care organiza-
tions continue to grow in this state, North Carolinians will look for
protection against substandard patient care. This Comment has
pointed out that North Carolina courts have already protected hospi-
tal patients from both the malpractice of physicians practicing in hos-
pitals and negligent actions of the hospital itself. Such reasoning
221. Id.
222. Pear, supra note 174, at Al.
223. N.C.G.S.§ 58-67-170(c) (1994).
224. 319 N.C. at 372, 354 S.E.2d at 455.
225. Id. at 377, 354 S.E.2d at 459.
226. See, e.g., Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Md. 1995) (concluding that
vicarious liability claims are not preempted by ERISA and, accordingly, remanding the action to
state court); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc, 865 F. Supp. 816, 868 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that vicari-
ous liability claim against HMO for malpractice was not "related" to administration of plan and,
therefore, not preempted by ERISA).
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could be extended towards HMOs. In the end, public policy may de-
mand that such laws be imposed in order to both deter substandard
patient care and compensate victims.
JAY JYOTI CHAUDHURI
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